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Tooth Discoloration
(continued from page 33)

is the clear purpose of Congress.
Lederle argued that the FDA
regulations in effect before the
1965 amendments did not permit
the company to add warning labels
regarding tooth staining without
FDA approval. Lederle did not
obtain the approval until 1963.
Lederle also claimed that warning
without approval would have violated federal regulation 21 C.F.R.
146.4, which prohibits the relabel.ling of drugs without FDA permission. Thus, Lederle asserted that it
would have violated federal regulations by complying with the New
Jersey law requiring a warning to
be communicated as soon as reasonably feasible once a company
gained actual or constructive
knowledge of a danger.
Feldman argued that Lederle
knew or, through the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have
known of the potentially serious
and permanent side effects of Declomycin at the time she ingested
the drug. Feldman also asserted
that, in light of this knowledge,
Lederle failed to warn antibiotic
consumers of these dangers in a
timely and reasonable fashion and
thereby violated state tort law.
The supreme court found no
direct conflict between federal and
state law. The court expressed concern that, since nothing in the
federal regulations explicitly preempted claims brought under state
law, a finding of preemption would
leave Feldman without a remedy.
Thus, the court asserted that using
the FDA regulation governing label changes as Lederle proposed
infringed on the state's powers to
protect and promote the safety of
its citizens.
The New Jersey Supreme Court
then considered whether the FDA
regulations actually precluded
Lederle from warning of Declomycin's dangerous side effects. Lederle argued that by warning without permission, it would have been
subject to either punishment for
misbranding or removal of its
product from the market. The
court disagreed, stating that the
FDA had determined that warning
of dangerous side effects at the
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earliest possible time was consistent with its goal of protecting
public health. The court offered
some alternatives Lederle could
have considered, including not distributing the drug, trying harder to
get approval, or waiting until more
tests were done to ascertain if the
drug caused tooth discoloration.
Finally, Lederle contended that
if the case were retried, Feldman
would not prevail. It relied on the
newly created New Jersey Products
Liability Statute, N.J.S.A.
2A:58C-4, which states that where
a warning or instruction has been
approved by the FDA, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the
label is adequate. However, the
court disagreed, asserting that label
adequacy standards were different
in the 1960s and that a strong
likelihood of rebutting the presumption existed in this case.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Judge Garibaldi criticized the majority's narrow view
of the FDA's role in society. The
FDA's mission is to make a riskutility analysis of drugs in order to
determine if the benefit to society
outweighs the potential dangers.
The Judge asserted that the FDA
has a greater accumulation of information and expertise on drugs
than any other source, including
Lederle. Thus, the majority opinion upset this risk-balancing analysis by imposing the court's judgment in hindsight upon drug
manufacturers.
Judge Garibaldi recognized that
promoting uniformity is another
goal of the FDA. Thus, the majority's contention that pre- 1965, drug
manufacturers could change a
product warning without FDA approval was erroneous. Otherwise,
with each manufacturer changing
labels upon its own prerogative,
labels would become useless and
unbelievable.
Gregory R. Bockin

Underinsured Motorists
Provisions Do Not Cover
Accident Victims Whose
Household Membership
Is Not Readily Apparent
In Vaiarella v. Hanover
Insurance Company, 567 N.E.2d
916 (Mass. 1991), the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that a mother involved in an
automobile accident was not entitled to a settlement under the
underinsured motorist provision
of her son's automobile insurance
policy because she was not a member of his household at the time of
the accident.
Background
Salvatore and Italia Vaiarella
("Mr. and Mrs. Vaiarella", respectively) lived in both East Boston
and Winthrop, Massachusetts between 1941 and 1984. Their son
Joseph ("Son") lived in Brockton,
Massachusetts, and their daughter
in East Boston. In August, 1984,
the Vaiarellas had their mail transferred to their daughter's address
but began living with their Son,
bringing with them some personal
items and furniture. Thereafter,
the Son began remodeling his garage into living quarters for his
parents.
In November, 1984, the Vaiarellas moved to Winter Haven, Florida. They planned to live there from
January to May each year and to
live in Brockton, Massachusetts
with their Son from May to December. Upon moving to Florida,
the Vaiarellas bought a mobile
home. This purchase required Mr.
Vaiarella to have a Florida driver's
license and a Florida registration
for the car he had bought in Brockton.
During the 1984 Christmas holidays, the Vaiarellas visited their
Son and returned to Florida immediately thereafter. At that time,
their living quarters in their Son's
garage had not yet been finished.
On May 3, 1985, after their winter
stay in Florida, the Vaiarellas started out for Brockton by car. En
route, the two were in a car accident that killed Mr. Vaiarella and
injured Mrs. Vaiarella.
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The Son had an automobile insurance policy with Hanover Insurance Company ("Hanover") at
the time of the accident. As mandated by Massachusetts law, the
policy provided both uninsured
and underinsured coverage for policy owners and relatives living in
their households. Mass. Gen. L. ch.
175, sect. 1 13L (1988). After Hanover denied a settlement to Mrs.
Vaiarella under the underinsured
provision of her Son's policy, she
filed suit in Massachusetts Superior Court. She alleged that Hanover
had violated a Massachusetts statute, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A, sections 2(a) and 9 (1988), by refusing
to make an offer of settlement.
The superior court found no
violation of the statute because, for
the purposes of underinsured motorist coverage, Mrs. Vaiarella was
not a member of her Son's household at the time of the accident.
The court held for Hanover, and
Mrs. Vaiarella appealed to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court.
Flexible Definition of Household
Member Does Not Include Future
Intentions
On appeal, Mrs. Vaiarella argued that the superior court erroneously determined she was not a
member of her Son's household for
insurance purposes. She further
alleged that Hanover had violated
Massachusetts state law by not
making a reasonable, good faith
investigation of her status. Mrs.
Vaiarella's primary support for
both arguments was that the superior court, in making the determination as to her status, failed to
consider her intention to live in her
Son's household for about six
months out of each year.
The supreme judicial court first
considered Mrs. Vaiarella's claim
of membership in her Son's household. It noted that because a variety of living arrangements exist in
today's society, an inflexible and
precise meaning should not be applied to the term "household member." However, the court indicated
that since the household member
requirement for underinsured motorist coverage was coatrolled by
statute, ambiguities in the policy
should not be construed against the
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insurance company. The definition
of household member, the court
reasoned, was a question of law
that required the examination of
specific facts on a case by case
basis.
The supreme judicial court reasoned that Mrs. Vaiarella's claim
was based almost entirely on future
intentions and not on an established living arrangement. Before
August, 1984, the Vaiarellas had
lived independently from both
their children for forty years. Although the Vaiarellas planned to
reside with their Son, they had
lived with him for only a few
months prior to the accident. Taken together, the Vaiarellas' history
of living independently from their
children, their four-month stay in
the Son's home, and their longterm intentions were not enough to
establish household membership.
The court added that Hanover
would not have known about the
Vaiarellas' intentions. Accurate
calculations of insurance risks require a knowledge of the volume of
persons covered; thus, the court
said, companies must be able to
identify all covered persons.
After discounting future intentions, the court considered other
factors which indicated where the
Vaiarellas had established residency. The court did not rule out the
possibility of dual residences, but
considered such matters as where
the Vaiarellas received their mail,
where they transacted business,
where they maintained possessions, as well as whether the Vaiarellas were financially dependant
upon their Son.
Although the Vaiarellas had
lived with their Son in Brockton,
they, nonetheless, transferred their
mail to their daughter. Their
daughter handled all their business
affairs. Once in Florida, they also
received mail there. At least some
of their possessions were in Florida, and Mr. Vaiarella obtained an
auto registration and driver's license in that state. (Since a Florida
driver's license and registration
were required to purchase the mobile home, the court noted that
these factors did not significantly
weaken Mrs. Vaiarella's claim of
residence in Massachusetts.)
Even though some of the Vai-

arellas' possessions were with their
Son, none of their activities or
transactions significantly indicated residence with him or financial
dependence upon him. Moreover,
after the car accident, Mrs. Vaiarella went to recuperate in her
daughter's home and then returned
to Florida, never again living with
her Son. Thus, the court concluded
that Mrs. Vaiarella had failed to
establish dual residences in Winter
Haven, Florida and Brockton,
Massachusetts.
Finally, the supreme judicial
court found no reason to comment
separately on whether Hanover
had made a reasonable, good faith
investigation to determine Mrs.
Vaiarella's residency.
Clarinda Gipson

Traditional Tort
Principles Dictate That
Corporate Successors
Are Not Liable To
Consumers
In Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594
A.2d 564 (Md. 1991), the Maryland Court of Appeals refused to
extend tort liability to a successor
corporation with no causal connection to the product causing a consumer's injury. The court reinforced the traditional principle
that fault must exist before tort
liability can be imposed.
Background
Frederick Brandt ("Brandt")
purchased a treadmill from Atlantic Fitness Products ("Atlantic") in
January, 1981. The treadmill was
designed, manufactured, and marketed by American Tredex Corporation ("American Tredex").
In July, 1981, Nissen Corporation ("Nissen") purchased all assets of American Tredex. The asset
purchase agreement specified that
Nissen would assume certain
American Tredex obligations and
liabilities. However, the agreement
explicitly stated that Nissen would
not shoulder any liability ensuing
from injuries associated with any
product previously sold by Ameri(continued on page 36)
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